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O P I N I O N 
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge:   
These appeals and cross-appeals involve a dispute over 
the sale of a small island in the U.S. Virgin Islands and an 
accompanying launching point on St. Thomas.  Robert Addie, 
Jorge Perez, and Jason Taylor entered into two contracts of 
sale to purchase these two properties from Christian Kjaer 
and his relatives, Helle Bundgaard, Steen Bundgaard, John 
Knud Fürst, Kim Fürst, and Nina Fürst (collectively, the 
Sellers).  As part of the contracts, Addie, Perez, and Taylor 
made a $1 million deposit and later paid an additional 
$500,000 to push back the closing date for the sale of the 
properties.  The sale was never consummated, however, and 
Addie, Perez, and Taylor demanded the return of the deposits.  
Kjaer and his relatives refused, and this litigation ensued.   
 
Addie, Perez, and Taylor appeal the District Court’s 
orders dated August 14, 2009, March 1, 2011, and May 13, 
2011.  In the cross-appeal, Kjaer and his relatives appeal the 
District Court’s orders dated March 1, 2011, and May 13, 
2011.  In the second cross-appeal, Kevin D’Amour, who was 
the sole owner and principal of the escrow agent for the 
transaction and who served as Kjaer’s attorney, appeals the 
District Court’s orders dated February 23, 2009, April 28, 
2009, and September 24, 2010.  For the reasons that follow, 
we will affirm in part and reverse in part. 
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I. Factual Background 
The Sellers own two properties in the Virgin Islands:  
Estate Great St. James, which is an island off the coast of St. 
Thomas, and Estate Nazareth, which is a launch point 
providing access to Estate Great St. James from St. Thomas.  
In 2004, Robert Addie, a Florida real estate investor, and 
Jorge Perez, a financial advisor to high-net-worth individuals, 
sought to purchase these properties.  Perez persuaded Jason 
Taylor, his client and a former Miami Dolphins player to join 
the deal.  
 
A. Terms of the Contracts 
In June 2004, Addie, Perez, and Taylor (collectively, 
the Buyers) entered into two land contracts (Contracts of 
Sale) and an Escrow Agreement to purchase Estate Great St. 
James and Estate Nazareth from the Sellers for $21 million 
and $2.5 million, respectively.  Premier Title Company, Inc.,
1
 
served as the escrow agent and was party to the Escrow 
Agreement.  Kevin D’Amour, the Sellers’ attorney-in-fact, 
was the sole owner and principal of Premier.  The Buyers 
assert that they were not aware of D’Amour’s role at Premier 
when they entered into the Escrow Agreement. 
 
The Contracts of Sale required the Buyers to submit an 
initial deposit of $1 million.  Closing was to occur “at a 
mutually acceptable time of day within sixty (60) days of the 
execution of this Agreement.”  The contracts permitted the 
Buyers to extend the closing an additional thirty days by 
                                              
1
Premier was formerly known as First American Title 
Company, Inc.  
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paying a $500,000 nonrefundable deposit.  The duty of the 
Buyers under the contract was to pay the purchase price at 
closing, less the deposit.  The duty of the Sellers was to 
deliver “Clear and Marketable” title and “[a]ssignments of all 
permits, submerged land leases and other licenses necessary 
for the existence and occupancy of the dock and other 
improvements on the Real Property, together with the 
required governmental consents thereto.”  The Contracts of 
Sale defined Clear and Marketable title as “such title as is 
acceptable to and insurable by Buyer’s title insurance 
company on ALTA Form B Owner’s Policy (or other 
reasonable form) free and clear of exceptions except licenses 
and easements, if any, for public utilities serving only the 
Real Property.”   
 
The Escrow Agreement required Premier to receive the 
Buyers’ deposits and then to release the deposits to the 
Sellers.  Premier agreed to release the first deposit to the 
Sellers within twenty-four hours after the Sellers delivered 
the escrow documents to the Buyers, as long as Premier 
received written notice from the Buyers that they were 
satisfied with the documents.  The escrow documents were to 
include (a) Insurable Warranty Deeds for both properties, (b) 
tax letters for both properties, (c) assignments of all permits, 
submerged land leases and other licenses necessary for the 
existence and occupancy of the dock and other improvements 
on the Island and the Nazareth Property, together with the 
required governmental consents thereto, including but not 
limited to assignments of Coastal Zone Permits; (d) a Foreign 
Investment in Real Property Tax Act (FIRPTA) Affidavit, (e) 
Sellers’ affidavits that might be reasonably requested by 
Buyers’ insurance company, and (f) an ALTA Form B 
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Owner’s Title Insurance Policy in the Seller’s name, showing 
that the properties are free and clear of all exceptions.   
Under the Contracts of Sale, the Buyers agreed to 
forfeit the deposits to the Sellers as liquidated damages in the 
event of the Buyers’ default or failure or refusal to perform, 
through no fault of the Seller.  The Sellers agreed to return the 
deposits in the event of the Sellers’ default or failure or 
refusal to perform, through no fault of the Buyer.  The 
Contracts of Sale required the non-defaulting party to send 
written notice of default, and the defaulting party would have 
ten days from the receipt of written notice to cure the default.   
 
B. Closing on the Contracts 
On June 4, 2004, Addie, Perez, and the Sellers’ 
attorney, Kevin D’Amour, met in Miami to sign the Contracts 
of Sale and the Escrow Agreement.  Unable to attend the 
meeting, Taylor signed the Contracts of Sale and Escrow 
Agreement on June 15, 2004, and faxed them to D’Amour.   
 
Taylor alone funded the initial $1 million deposit by 
sending three wire transfers to the escrow account between 
June 9 and June 11.  During July, D’Amour, acting on behalf 
of Premier, made several deliveries of escrow documents to 
the Buyers.  Included in the documents were the Coastal Zone 
permits for the use of the docks at Estate Nazareth and Estate 
Great St. James.  The permits for both docks had already 
expired.  Also among the documents, the commitment for title 
insurance contained a number of exceptions to the required 
coverage, including an exception for “any portion or portions 
of the [properties] subject to or contiguous with property 
subject to the Virgin Islands Open Shoreline Act” and an 
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exception for a Right of Way Agreement for a road on Estate 
Nazareth.   
D’Amour began to request that the Buyers authorize 
the release of the deposit to the Sellers.  On August 3, Perez 
authorized release of the deposit in an email stating:  “I have 
spoken to Hank Smock [local counsel to the Buyers], and he 
has advised me that we can go ahead and release the first 
deposit of $1,000,000.00.”  Based on this email, D’Amour, 
acting on behalf of Premier, released the deposit to the 
Sellers.  
 
Taylor also unilaterally funded the second deposit of 
$500,000 to extend the closing date by sending three wire 
transfers to the escrow account between August 5 and August 
19.  On August 20, D’Amour emailed the Buyers asking them 
to “confirm by return email that the Escrow Agent [Premier] 
may release the [second deposit], subject to the terms of the 
Escrow Agreement.”  D’Amour did not receive written 
confirmation from the Buyers but nonetheless, acting on 
behalf of Premier, released the deposit to the Sellers.   
 
In early September, the Sellers and the Buyers 
discussed extending the closing a second time.  D’Amour 
informed the Buyers that the Sellers agreed to extend the 
closing date, stating:  
 
As a follow-up to my conversation with Jorge 
yesterday, my clients have consented to a one 
week extension of time to close.  The original 
closing date was September 4, 2004.  Since this 
fell on a Saturday, the next business day was 
September 7, 2004.  (see Section 4).  The 
closing date is now September 14, 2004.  Time 
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is of the Essence.  This extension shall not be 
deemed a waiver of any rights the sellers have 
under the Contract. 
 
As of September 14, the Buyers had not paid the 
purchase price and the Sellers had not conveyed either up-
dated assignments of permits or a Clear and Marketable title.  
On September 16, D’Amour sent the Buyers a notice of 
default, informing them that they had ten days to cure.  On 
September 22 and 23, the Buyers demanded the immediate 
return of the escrow money, claiming that the Sellers were 
unable to deliver Clear and Marketable title.  On September 
24, D’Amour sent a request to the Buyers that they confirm 
their intentions to cure the default.  The Buyers never 
responded.   
 
II. Procedural Background 
On October 15, 2004, the Buyers filed suit in the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands, asserting claims against 
the Sellers for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, 
negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and conversion.  The 
Sellers filed counterclaims against the Buyers for breach of 
contract and fraud.  The Buyers also filed suit against Premier 
and D’Amour for fraud and conversion. 
 
Prior to trial, the District Court ruled on several 
motions for summary judgment.  On the Sellers’ motions, the 
District Court dismissed the Buyers’ claims against the 
Sellers for negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and conversion.  
On the Buyers’ motions, the District Court held D’Amour 
liable for conversion of the second deposit of $500,000.  In 
addition, the Buyers and Premier settled prior to trial.   
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On June 22, 2009, the case proceeded to trial on the 
following issues:  (1) the Buyers’ breach of contract claim 
against the Sellers, (2) the Sellers’ breach of contract claim 
against the Buyers, (3) the Buyers’ unjust enrichment claim 
against the Sellers, (4) the Sellers’ claim of fraud against the 
Buyers, (5) the Buyers’ fraud claim against D’Amour, and (6) 
the Buyers’ claim that D’Amour had converted Buyers’ first 
deposit of $1 million. 
 
A. Unjust Enrichment Claim 
During the liability stage of trial, the jury found that 
the Sellers had been unjustly enriched.  However, the District 
Court withheld the claim from the jury during the damages 
stage of trial and informed the parties that the Court would 
determine the amount of damages to award.  After a full 
briefing by the parties, the District Court held the Buyers 
could not recover for unjust enrichment.  The District Court 
explained, “[u]njust enrichment is an equitable remedy” 
whereby “it is well settled that unjust enrichment damages are 
unavailable when a claim rests on a breach of an express 
contract.”  Addie v. Kjaer, No. 2004-135, 2009 WL 2584833, 
at *5 (Aug. 14, 2009).  The court reasoned that there was no 
dispute that the parties entered into valid, binding contracts.  
The Court concluded, “there is no doubt that the Buyers’ 
breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims arise out of 
precisely the same core of operative facts:  the 
unconsummated sale of land and the misdelivery of 
associated escrow funds.”  Accordingly, the District Court 
held that making an award for unjust enrichment was 
inappropriate.   
 
B. Breach of Contract Claims 
11 
 
At trial, the jury found that Taylor did not breach the 
contract, but that Addie and Perez did.  In addition, the jury 
found that all of the Sellers had breached, and awarded Taylor 
alone $1,546,000 in damages.  On August 14, 2009, the 
District Court reduced this award to $1,500,000, representing 
the actual amount expended by Taylor.  Sellers moved for 
reconsideration.  On March 1, 2011, the District Court 
granted Sellers’ motion, in part, amending the jury’s award to 
Taylor from $1.5 million to $0.  The Court reasoned that the 
Contracts of Sale imposed concurrent conditions and all of 
the parties had failed to satisfy these conditions within the 
closing timeframe.  Because all of the parties had defaulted, 
the District Court held that no one could recover for breach of 
contract.  Thus, Taylor could not recoup the $1.5 million 
deposit. 
 
C. Tort Claims 
1. The Sellers’ Claims Against the Buyers 
On Sellers’ fraudulent misrepresentation claim against 
the Buyers, the jury found that Addie and Perez were liable 
for misrepresenting their financial ability to purchase the 
properties, but that Taylor was not.  The jury awarded the 
Sellers $339,516.76 in damages.  On August 14, 2009, the 
District Court entered judgment on the matter, affirming the 
jury’s verdict and award of damages to Sellers.  Addie and 
Perez moved for judgment as a matter of law.  On May 13, 
2011, the District Court granted Addie and Perez’s motion, 
vacating the $339,516.76 jury award.  The Court reasoned 
that judgment as a matter of law was appropriate because the 
gist of the action doctrine barred Sellers’ fraudulent 
misrepresentation claim, as it “essentially parrots the Sellers’ 
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breach of contract claim.”  Addie v. Kjaer, No. 2004-135, 
2009 WL 1841131, at *5 (May 13, 2009).  The court also 
reasoned that Sellers’ claim for fraudulent inducement was 
waived because it had not been properly raised.   
 
2.  The Buyers’ Fraud and Conversion Claims Against 
 D’Amour 
 
Prior to trial, the District Court granted summary 
judgment to the Buyers on their conversion claim against 
D’Amour, concerning the second deposit of $500,000, and 
denied D’Amour’s motions for reconsideration and judgment 
as a matter of law.  At trial, the Buyers alleged that D’Amour:  
 
fraudulently represented the 
Sellers’ ability to deliver valid 
escrow documents…as promised 
in the Escrow Agreement, made 
false statements about the Buyers’ 
obligation to release escrow 
funds, made false statements 
about Sellers’ ability to deliver 
clear and marketable title, and 
failed to disclose his interest in 
the escrow agency.   
 
Addie v. Kjaer, No. 2004-135, 2009 WL 3810883, at *5 
(Sept. 10, 2009).  The jury found that D’Amour was liable for 
false representation and failure to disclose and awarded the 
Buyers $46,000 in damages.  In addition, the jury found that 
D’Amour was not liable for conversion of the first deposit of 
$1 million.  In an order dated September 24, 2010, the 
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District Court upheld the $46,000 award and explained that it 
entered judgment for Taylor alone because Addie and Perez 
had filed a notice of renunciation of their interest in the 
award. 
 
All of the parties appealed.   
III. Discussion2 
We must address two key issues in these appeals.  The 
first issue is which party is entitled to the $1.5 million 
deposit.  The Sellers assert that they are entitled to the deposit 
under a theory of breach of contract, while Taylor asserts that 
he is entitled to the deposit because holding otherwise would 
unjustly enrich the Sellers.  The second issue is whether the 
gist of the action doctrine bars the tort claims in this action.  
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that (1) Taylor is 
entitled to recover the $1.5 million deposit in restitution, and 
(2) the tort claims are barred by the gist of the action doctrine. 
 
Because this case arises out of diversity jurisdiction, 
Virgin Islands law governs.  See Flemming v. Air Sunshine, 
Inc., 311 F.3d 282, 292-93 (3d Cir. 2002).  Under Virgin 
Islands law:  
 
The rules of the common law, as 
expressed in the restatements of 
the law approved by the American 
Law Institute, and to the extent 
                                              
2
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1332 and 48 U.S.C. § 1612(a).  We have appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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not so expressed, as generally 
understood and applied in the 
United States, shall be the rules of 
decision in the courts of the 
Virgin Islands in cases to which 
they apply, in the absence of local 
laws to the contrary. 
 
V.I. Code Ann. tit. 1 § 4.  Furthermore, “[t]he Virgin Islands 
have adopted the Restatement (Second) of Contracts as the 
definitive source of decisional contract law, absent any local 
laws to the contrary.” Alejandro  v. L.S. Holding, Inc., 310 F. 
Supp. 2d 745, 748 n.2 (D.V.I. 2004). 
 
A. Breach of Contract 
We first address the Sellers’ breach of contract claim.  
The Sellers challenge the District Court’s denial of their 
motion for judgment as a matter of law on their breach of 
contract claim against the Buyers.  “We review the denial of 
judgment as a matter of law de novo, viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to . . . the prevailing party.”  
McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, 649 F.3d 171, 176 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
 
The Sellers assert that they are entitled to retain the 
$1.5 million deposit as liquidated damages under a breach of 
contract theory.  The District Court held, and the Buyers 
agree, that the contracts imposed concurrent conditions on the 
parties, and that due to both parties’ failure to perform, the 
duties under the contracts were discharged.  The Sellers agree 
with the District Court that the contracts imposed concurrent 
conditions on the parties, whereby performance by one party 
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was conditioned upon the performance of the other party.  
The Sellers also agree that the District Court arrived at the 
correct result by refusing to return the deposit to the Buyers.  
However, the Sellers maintain that the District Court erred by 
upholding the jury verdict that they had breached the contract. 
In upholding the jury verdict, the District Court reasoned, 
“the Sellers did not prove that they extended an appropriate 
offer to perform.”  Addie v. Kjaer, No. 2004-135, 2011 WL 
797402, at *9 (Mar. 1, 2011).  The Sellers maintain, however, 
that they offered performance and the Buyers did not, which 
resulted in the Buyers’ breach.  In the alternative, the Sellers 
maintain that the Buyers repudiated the contracts, which 
obviated the Sellers’ need to offer performance.   
 
1. Concurrent Conditions 
As the Restatement instructs, agreements concerning 
an exchange of promises require performance to be 
exchanged simultaneously whenever possible, unless the 
agreement indicates otherwise.  Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 238 (1981).  This simultaneous exchange of 
performances creates concurrent conditions, under which 
performance by one party creates a condition precedent for 
performance by the other party.  Id. § 238 cmt. a.  
 
Here, the Sellers were required to convey Clear and 
Marketable title and assignments of all permits, leases, and 
licenses necessary for the existence and occupancy of the 
docks in exchange for the Buyers’ payment of the balance of 
the purchase price.  Because the Contracts of Sale do not 
indicate otherwise, the performance of each obligation was to 
occur simultaneously.  Therefore, as the District Court held, 
“[f]ulfillment of each obligation was a concurrent condition 
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to the other.”  Addie v. Kjaer, No. 2004-135, 2011 WL 
797402, at *6 (Mar. 1, 2011).  We agree and hold that the 
contract contained concurrent conditions. 
 
2. Offer of Performance 
The Sellers dispute the District Court’s holding that 
they failed to offer performance.  The Sellers maintain that 
they offered performance by tendering escrow documents that 
demonstrated the Sellers’ present ability to close because (1) 
the documents “complied with the essential terms of the 
contract” and (2) the “Buyers waived any defects in the 
documents.”  The Sellers also maintain that sending notices 
of default to Buyers beginning on September 16, 2004, 
constituted valid offers of performance.  
 
In a contract with concurrent conditions, a party is not 
required to perform until the other party makes a valid offer 
to perform.  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 238 cmt. a. 
(1981).  If no party performs, neither party is in default, nor 
liable for breach.  Id.  Thus, a claimant alleging breach of a 
contract that contains concurrent conditions must at least 
show that he or she offered to perform, and that the other 
party defaulted.  Id.  The Restatement further instructs that a 
valid offer to perform “must be made with the manifested 
present ability to make it good, but the offeror need not go so 
far as actually to hold out that which he is to deliver.”  Id.  
However, “[w]hen it is too late for either to make such an 
offer, both parties are discharged by the non-occurrence of a 
condition.”  Id.  
The Sellers’ delivery of escrow documents did not 
amount to a valid offer of performance.  First, the escrow 
documents contained non-conforming documents, such as the 
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expired dock permits and the exceptions to the commitment 
for title insurance.  Moreover, this transaction involved two 
sets of contracts, in which the Sellers agreed to two separate 
deliveries.  Under the Escrow Agreement, the Sellers agreed 
to deliver the escrow documents, while under the Contracts of 
Sale the Sellers agreed to deliver Clear and Marketable title 
and assignments “at a mutually acceptable time of day.”  The 
Clear and Marketable title and the assignments were never 
delivered.  The Escrow Agreement provided that “[a]t the 
Closing (as such term is defined in the Contracts of Sale) the 
Escrow Agent shall deliver the Escrow Documents to the 
Buyer.”  However, as the District Court correctly stated, this 
provision does not “diminish the Sellers’ involvement in the 
conveyance of the property.”  The common law, as it is 
generally understood and applied in the United States, 
supports the conclusion that the Seller must do more than 
deliver a deed into escrow to convey title.  See, e.g., United 
States v. O’Dell, 247 F.3d 644, 682 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting, 
“[t]hough O’Dell, Jr. signed the Warranty Deed over to 
Defendant, the deed was not delivered to Defendant because 
it was deposited with the escrow agent”).3  Therefore, despite 
                                              
3
 See also In re Chrisman, 35 F. Supp. 282, 283 (C.D. Cal. 
1940) (“In California, as elsewhere, delivery of an instrument 
in escrow conveys no title.”); Masquart v. Dick, 310 P.2d 
732, 749 (Or. 1957) (noting that a deed held in escrow “does 
not become a deed and operate to convey title until the second 
delivery, or perhaps, more accurately speaking, until the 
performance of a condition”) (quotation marks omitted); Yost 
v. Miller, 74 Ind. Ct. App. 673, 129 N.E. 487, 488 (Ind. App. 
1921) (“A deed in escrow conveys no title until final 
delivery.”).  But see Matter of Newcomb, 744 F.2d 621, 626 
(8th Cir. 1984) (“[I]t is recognized that some interest in 
18 
 
Sellers’ assertions that the documents “complied with the 
essential terms of the contract” and that the “Buyers waived 
any defects in the documents,” Clear and Marketable title was 
not delivered. 
 
Furthermore, the Sellers’ notices of default to the 
Buyers beginning on September 16, 2004, did not amount to 
valid offers of performance.  After September 15, neither 
party was required to perform.  The District Court held that 
the last day to close was September 15.  Therefore, the duties 
of the parties had already been discharged on September 16 
because neither party performed.
4
  We therefore hold that the 
Sellers did not provide a valid offer of performance.   
 
3.  Repudiation 
In the alternative, the Sellers argue that their 
performance was excused due to the Buyers’ repudiation.  
The Sellers allege that the Buyers’ “continuous requests for 
extensions of the closing date” clearly communicated an 
inability to close.  According to the Sellers, these continuous 
requests consisted of (1) the Buyers’ first request to extend 
the closing, pursuant to Article 1.1 of the Escrow Agreement, 
and (2) the Buyers’ second request to extend the closing, to 
which the Sellers approved a weeklong extension.  In 
addition, the Sellers allege that the Buyers repudiated by 
demanding the return of the deposit and by ignoring 
D’Amour’s request for assurance. 
                                                                                                     
escrowed property is transferred to the ultimate grantee under 
the escrow at the creation of the escrow.”). 
4
 The Sellers argue that the last date to close was September 
14.  Regardless, the Sellers’ notices also came after this date. 
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The Restatement defines repudiation as: 
 
(a) a statement by the obligor to 
the obligee indicating that the 
obligor will commit a breach that 
would of itself give the obligee a 
claim for damages for total breach 
under § 243, or (b) a voluntary 
affirmative act which renders the 
obligor unable or apparently 
unable to perform without such a 
breach. 
 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 250 (1981).  This 
statement “must be sufficiently positive to be reasonably 
interpreted to mean that the party will not or cannot perform.”  
Id. cmt. b.  Moreover, a “[m]ere expression of doubts as to his 
willingness or ability to perform is not enough to constitute a 
repudiation.”  Id.     
 
When repudiation occurs, it excuses the non-
occurrence of the other party’s conditional duty.  Id. at § 225 
cmt. b..  The Restatement instructs further:    
 
If one of the parties is already in 
breach, as where he has 
repudiated or has failed to go to 
the place appointed for the 
simultaneous exchange, the other 
party’s duty to render 
performance may already have 
been discharged under 253(2) or 
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237, giving him a claim for 
damages for total breach under 
253(1) or 243(1). 
 
Id. at § 238.   
 Here, the Buyers’ two requests to extend the closing 
date indicated neither that they intended to breach, nor that 
they were unable to perform.  In fact, were the Sellers’ 
allegations true, it would bring about a paradoxical result.  
The Contracts of Sale expressly permitted the Buyers to 
extend the closing date an additional thirty days at an 
additional cost.  Therefore, if this request were deemed 
repudiation, it would also mean that the Contracts themselves 
contemplated and permitted repudiation.  Furthermore, the 
Buyers’ second request does not indicate that they intended to 
breach.  A request for extension “cannot be reasonably 
interpreted to mean that the party will not and cannot 
perform.”  Id. § 250 (1981).  In fact, the request indicates, to 
the contrary, that the Buyers were attempting to avoid default 
by postponing the due date of their performance. 
 
 Furthermore, the Sellers’ allegation that the Buyers 
repudiated on September 22, 23, and afterward is also 
unsupportable.  As discussed supra, the last day to close on 
the sale would have been September 15, 2004.  Accordingly, 
the Contracts of Sale required the parties to satisfy their 
respective obligations by this date.  Because we hold that the 
conditions were not satisfied by the last day to close under the 
contracts, the duties of the parties were discharged, leaving 
neither party liable for breach.  In other words, Buyers were 
incapable of repudiating the contract after September 15.   
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We therefore hold that Sellers were not excused from 
providing a valid offer of performance in order to maintain an 
action for breach.  Furthermore, the contracts imposed 
concurrent conditions on the parties, which both parties failed 
to perform, resulting in the discharge of both parties duties 
under the contracts.  For these reasons, we therefore affirm 
the holding of the District Court that no one could recover for 
breach of contract. 
 
B. Restitution  
We next address the District Court’s decision with 
respect to restitution – or “unjust enrichment” as the District 
Court denominated it.
5
  The District Court held that the 
Buyers were not entitled to restitution because the Buyers’ 
claim rested on a breach of an express contract, “the 
unconsummated sale of land and the misdelivery of 
associated escrow funds.”  Addie v. Kjaer, No. 2004-135, 
2009 WL 2584833, at *5 (Aug. 14, 2009).  On appeal, Taylor 
challenges the District Court’s finding that the Buyers were 
precluded from obtaining restitution.  Our review of the 
                                              
5
 The District Court and the Buyers refer to this claim as one 
for “unjust enrichment.”  Because the Virgin Islands has 
adopted the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, we follow its 
use of the term “restitution.”  See Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 370.  As the American Law Institute recently 
noted, when “refer[ring] to a theory of liability or a body of 
legal doctrine,” the two terms are “generally 
. . . synonymous.”  Restatement (Third) of Restitution and 
Unjust Enrichment § 1 cmt. c (2011).  In addition, because 
the Buyers seek to recover the specific benefit provided to the 
Sellers, the term “restitution” is appropriate.  See id.   
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application of legal precepts is plenary.  Fed. Kemper Ins. Co. 
v. Rauscher, 807 F.2d 345, 348 (3d Cir. 1986).  
 
Here, the law in the Virgin Islands is silent with regard 
to awarding restitution in cases involving valid contracts.  
Therefore, we look to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
for applicable law: 
 
A party whose duty of 
performance does not arise or is 
discharged as a result of 
impracticability of performance, 
frustration of purpose, non-
occurrence of a condition or 
disclaimer by a beneficiary is 
entitled to restitution for any 
benefit that he has conferred on the 
other party by way of part 
performance or reliance. 
 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 377 (1981).  For 
example, the Restatement illustrates: “A contracts to sell a 
tract of land to B for $100,000.  After B has made a part 
payment of $20,000, A wrongfully refuses to transfer title.  B 
can recover the $20,000 in restitution.”  Id. at § 373 illus. 1. 
 
 Here, the District Court erred by failing to apply this 
Restatement provision.  In applying the Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts, it is clear that restitution is in order.  Taylor 
provided a deposit of $1.5 million to the Sellers with the 
intent to purchase the two properties with Addie and Perez.  
However, all of the parties failed to perform within the 
timeframe specified in the contracts, and their respective 
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duties were discharged.  Thus, as the Restatement instructs, 
Taylor is entitled to restitution for the benefit of the deposit 
that he conferred to the Sellers.   
 
We therefore hold that Taylor is entitled to restitution of 
the $1.5 million deposit from the Sellers. 
 
C. The Tort Claims 
We next address whether the gist of the action doctrine 
applies to the tort claims in this action.  The District Court 
held that the gist of the action doctrine barred Sellers’ claims 
against the Buyers, but that it did not bar the Buyers’ claims 
against D’Amour.  On appeal, the Sellers assert that the 
doctrine does not apply to their claims against the Buyers for 
fraudulent inducement and fraudulent misrepresentation.  
D’Amour, on the other hand, asserts that the doctrine does 
apply to the Buyers’ claims for fraud and conversion against 
him.  For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the gist of 
the action doctrine applies to bar all of the tort claims in this 
litigation. 
 
1. Legal Framework  
We first review the application of the gist of the 
action doctrine in the Virgin Islands.  The gist of the action 
doctrine is a theory under common law “designed to maintain 
the conceptual distinction between breach of contract claims 
and tort claims.”  eToll, Inc. v. Elias/Savion Adver., Inc., 811 
A.2d 10, 14 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).  The doctrine is policy-
based, arising out of the concern that tort recovery should not 
be permitted for contractual breaches.  Glazer v. Chandler, 
200 A.2d 416, 418 (Pa. 1964).  Thus, while the existence of a 
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contractual relationship between two parties does not prevent 
one party from bringing a tort claim against another, the gist 
of the action doctrine precludes tort suits for the mere breach 
of contractual duties unless the plaintiff can point to separate 
or independent events giving rise to the tort.  See Air Prods. 
& Chem., Inc. v. Eaton Metal Prods. Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 
329, 340 (E.D. Pa. 2003).  Generally, courts apply the gist of 
the action doctrine when the claims are 
 
(1) arising solely from a contract 
between the parties; (2) where the 
duties allegedly breached were 
created and grounded in the 
contract itself; (3) where liability 
stems from a contract; or (4) 
where the tort claim essentially 
duplicates a breach of contact 
claim or the success of which is 
wholly dependent on the terms of 
a contract. 
 
eToll, Inc. v. Elias/Savion Adver., Inc., 811 A.2d 10, 19 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2002) (internal citations omitted).   
 
Neither this Court in its former supervisory capacity, 
nor the Virgin Islands Supreme Court has explicitly held that 
the gist of the action doctrine applies under Virgin Islands 
law.  However, the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands has 
applied the doctrine in contract disputes arising in the Virgin 
Islands.  See Ringo v. Southland Gaming of the U.S.V.I., Inc., 
No. ST–10–CV–116 (MCD), 2010 WL 7746074, at *6 (V.I. 
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Super. Ct. Sept. 22, 2010).
6
  In addition, the District Court of 
the Virgin Islands has predicted “that Virgin Islands would 
adopt the Third Circuit’s application of the gist of the action 
test” and has applied the doctrine.  Charleswell v. Chase 
Manhattan Bank, 308 F. Supp. 2d 545, 566-67 (D.V.I. 2004); 
see also Davis v. Ragster, CIV. 2005-155, 2008 WL 
2074026, at *6 (D.V.I. May 14, 2008) (applying gist of the 
action doctrine to a claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress); Galt Capital, LLP v. Seykota, CIV. 2002-
63, 2007 WL 2126287, at *3 (D.V.I. July 18, 2007), vacated 
in part, CIV. 2002-63, 2007 WL 6027812 (D.V.I. Aug. 10, 
2007) (applying doctrine to intentional misrepresentation).  
We agree and hold that the doctrine is applicable in the Virgin 
Islands.  
 
2. Sellers’ Fraud Claims Against Buyers 
The Sellers challenge the District Court’s May 13, 
2011, order granting Addie and Perez judgment as a matter of 
law on the fraud counterclaim.  The Sellers argue that they 
                                              
6
 See also Jefferson v. Bay Isles Associates, L.L.L.P, CV No. 
ST–09–CV–186, 2011 WL 3853332, at *10 (V.I. Super. Ct. 
Feb. 11, 2011) (acknowledging the application of the gist of 
the action doctrine in the Virgin Islands).  But see First Am. 
Dev. Group/Carib, LLC v. WestLB AG, 55 V.I. 316, 331 (V.I. 
Super. Ct. 2011) (“There is no provision in the Code or the 
Restatement for the gist-of-the-action doctrine; furthermore, 
as Pennsylvania is apparently the only state to have adopted 
the doctrine, the Court cannot say that it is a rule of the 
common law ‘as generally understood and applied in the 
United States.’”).   
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raised two independent fraud claims at trial, fraudulent 
misrepresentation and fraudulent inducement.  The District 
Court held that the gist of the action doctrine barred the 
Sellers’ fraudulent misrepresentation claim and that the 
Sellers’ fraudulent inducement claim was waived because it 
was not raised properly before the District Court.  We review 
orders on a motion for judgment as a matter of law under 
Rule 50(b) de novo, where such a motion may be granted, 
“only if, as a matter of law, the record is critically deficient of 
that minimum quantity of evidence from which a jury might 
reasonably afford relief.”  Trabal v. Wells Fargo Armored 
Serv. Corp., 269 F.3d 243, 249 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 
Here, the Sellers’ fraudulent misrepresentation claim 
was clearly barred by the gist of the action doctrine because 
the misrepresentation became a part of the contract.  The 
Sellers alleged that the Buyers “made material 
misrepresentations in Paragraph 12 of the Contracts of Sale, 
regarding Plaintiffs’ financial ability to close with cash . . .. ”  
The Sellers’ use of the Contracts of Sale for evidence of the 
misrepresentation indicates that the misrepresentation became 
a part of the contract.  Therefore, we hold that this claim was 
barred by the gist of the action doctrine.   
 
As for fraudulent inducement, the record supports the 
District Court’s conclusion that Sellers’ pleadings do not state 
such a cause of action.  Rule 15(b)(2) allows for the 
amendment of a complaint to conform to the evidence offered 
at trial, as long as the parties consent either expressly or 
impliedly.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b)(2).  Here, Buyers never 
expressly consented to the amendment. The question then is 
whether Buyers gave their implied consent.  To determine 
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whether a party has impliedly consented to the amendment of 
a pleading, courts look to: 
 
whether the parties recognized 
that the unpleaded issue entered 
the case at trial, whether the 
evidence that supports the 
unpleaded issue was introduced at 
trial without objection, and 
whether a finding of trial by 
consent prejudiced the opposing 
party’s opportunity to respond. 
 
Douglas v. Owens, 50 F.3d 1226, 1236 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(citations omitted).  Furthermore, “an issue has not been tried 
by implied consent if evidence relevant to the new claim is 
also relevant to the claim originally pled, because the 
defendant does not have any notice that the implied claim was 
being tried.”  Id.   
 
At trial, any evidence that the Sellers introduced to 
support a fraudulent inducement claim would have been 
highly relevant to their fraudulent misrepresentation claim.  
Consequently, there would have been no way for Buyers to be 
on notice of Sellers’ claim of fraudulent inducement.  With 
neither express nor implied consent from the Buyers, the 
Sellers’ have not amended their complaint to include a claim 
for fraudulent inducement.  Therefore, we hold that the 
Sellers waived the fraudulent inducement claim by failing to 
properly amend their pleadings. 
 
3.  Buyers’ Fraud and Conversion Claims Against  
 D’Amour 
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Finally, we address D’Amour’s challenge to the 
District Court’s decisions with regard to the conversion claim 
for the second deposit of $500,000 and the fraud claims 
against D’Amour.  With regard to the conversion claim, 
D’Amour asserts that the District Court erred by granting 
summary judgment to the Buyers and by denying his motions 
for reconsideration, an amended judgment, and judgment as a 
matter of law.  With regard to the fraud claims, D’Amour 
asserts that the District Court erred by denying his motion for 
an amended judgment and judgment as a matter of law.  Our 
“review of the substance of an order granting a summary 
judgment motion is plenary.”  St. Surin v. Virgin Islands 
Daily News, Inc., 21 F.3d 1309, 1313 (3d Cir. 1994).  We 
review motions to alter or amend a judgment filed pursuant to 
Rule 59(e) review for abuse of discretion, “except over 
matters of law, which are subject to plenary review.”  
Cureton v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 252 F.3d 267, 
272 (3d Cir. 2001).  Finally, “[w]e review the denial of 
judgment as a matter of law de novo, viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to … the prevailing party.”  
McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, 649 F.3d 171, 176 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
 
The Buyers maintain that the District Court properly 
held that the gist of the action doctrine is inapplicable because 
D’Amour was not a named party to the Contracts of Sale or 
the Escrow Agreement.  In addition, the Buyers maintain that 
the District Court properly held that the duties allegedly 
breached by D’Amour were not grounded solely in the 
contracts themselves, but rather gave rise to independent tort 
claims.  We discuss each issue in turn below. 
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First, we address whether the gist of the action 
doctrine applies to D’Amour despite the fact that he was not a 
party to the contracts.  This “doctrine precludes plaintiffs 
from re-casting ordinary breach of contract claims into tort 
claims.”  Pediatrix Screening, Inc. v. TeleChem Int’l, Inc., 
602 F.3d 541, 548 (3d Cir. 2010); see also eToll, Inc. v. 
Elias/Savion Adver., Inc., 811 A.2d 10, 19 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2002) (citations omitted).  Application of this doctrine 
frequently requires courts to engage in a factually intensive 
inquiry as to the nature of a plaintiff’s claims.  See Baker v. 
Family Credit Counseling Corp., 440 F. Supp. 2d 392, 418 
(E.D. Pa. 2006). 
 
Other courts
7
 analyzing the gist of the action doctrine 
provide guidance in applying the gist of the action doctrine to 
an individual who is not a party to the contract.  These courts 
regularly find that the gist of the action doctrine bars tort 
claims against an individual officer-defendant where the 
duties allegedly breached were created by a contract between 
the plaintiff and the defendant’s company.  See, e.g., eToll, 
                                              
7
 The District Court declined to apply the gist of the action 
doctrine, reasoning that its application in previous Third 
Circuit cases was “rooted exclusively in Pennsylvania law” 
and “must still be squared with Virgin Islands law.”  Addie v. 
Kjaer, No. 2004-135, 2009 WL 1140006, at *6 (D.V.I. Apr. 
28, 2009).  However, as we hold today, the gist of the action 
doctrine applies under Virgin Islands law.  Therefore, prior 
cases from this Court and the courts of Pennsylvania 
analyzing the doctrine are instructive in determining the 
application of the doctrine to individuals acting on behalf of a 
contracting party. 
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811 A.2d at 20-21.  In eToll, for example, the Superior Court 
of Pennsylvania applied the gist of the action doctrine and 
affirmed dismissal of a claim of fraud against several 
corporate officers because the “alleged acts of fraud arose in 
the course of the . . . contractual relationship” between the 
plaintiff and the corporate officers’ company.  eToll, 811 
A.3d at 12, 20.  
 
The same principle resolves this case.  Although 
D’Amour was not a party to the contracts, the Buyers cannot 
detach D’Amour from his status as agent for Premier.  
D’Amour was the sole principal and shareholder of Premier.  
Therefore, Premier could not perform its duties under the 
Escrow Agreement but for D’Amour’s actions.  In addition, 
the Buyers cannot detach D’Amour from his status as an 
agent for the Sellers.  D’Amour was acting on behalf of the 
Sellers when making the allegedly fraudulent statements.  In 
fact, these statements were memorialized in the contracts as 
the Sellers’ promises of performance to the Buyers.  
 
Furthermore, the alleged duties that D’Amour 
breached were all created and grounded in the contracts.  
Relating to his role as Sellers’ attorney, the fraud allegations 
included fraudulently representing the Sellers’ ability to 
deliver valid escrow documents and Clear and Marketable 
Title, and making false statements about the Buyers’ 
obligation to release escrow funds.  These allegations all 
relate to the contractual undertakings of the Sellers, and 
resulted in separate claims that the Sellers had breached the 
contracts.   
Relating to his role as an officer of Premier, the 
allegations included D’Amour’s failure to disclose his interest 
in the escrow agency and conversion.  These allegations 
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relate to the contractual undertakings of Premier.  As we have 
already stated, all of Premier’s actions were performed by 
D’Amour because he was the sole principal and shareholder 
of Premier.  Therefore, D’Amour’s actions in question here 
were inextricably intertwined with the contract claims.  
 
We therefore hold that the gist of the action doctrine 
bars the tort claims Buyers asserted against D’Amour, all of 
which were based upon conduct that allegedly breached the 
contracts.  We will reverse the District Court and order that 
the District Court enter judgment in D’Amour’s favor finding 
him not liable. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s August 14, 2009, order to the extent that it entered 
judgment against the Buyers on their unjust enrichment claim, 
reinstating the verdict of the jury.  We will order the District 
Court to enter judgment in Taylor’s favor and to order the 
return of the deposit to Taylor.  We will affirm the District 
Court’s March 1, 2011, order (1) denying Sellers’ motions for 
judgment as a matter of law on the breach of contract and 
fraud claims and (2) granting in part Sellers’ motion for 
amended judgment, by reducing Taylor’s recovery against 
Sellers to $0.  We will affirm the District Court’s May 13, 
2011, order granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of 
Addie and Perez on the Sellers’ fraud counterclaim.  We will 
reverse the District Court’s April 28, 2009, order on 
D’Amour’s motion for reconsideration of the District Court’s 
February 23, 2009, order granting partial summary judgment 
on Buyers’ conversion claim for the second deposit of 
$500,000.  We will reverse the District Court’s September 24, 
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2010, order denying judgment as a matter of law, amended 
judgment, or alternatively, a new trial to D’Amour on the 
fraud and conversion claims against him, and order that the 
District Court enter judgment in D’Amour’s favor finding 
him not liable.   
